Infractions appeal - Ohio State University
The NCAA News
The NCAA Division I Infractions Appeals Committee reversed three findings of violation and partially reversed another finding of violation against a former head men’s basketball coach, while also reversing four findings of violations against a former assistant men’s basketball coach at Ohio State University.
The Infractions Appeals Committee affirmed seven findings of violations and partially affirmed another finding of violation against the former head men’s basketball coach while also affirming four findings of violations against the former assistant men’s basketball coach. In addition, the Infractions Appeals Committee remanded a show-cause penalty against the former head men’s basketball coach to the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions for reconsideration.
The violations in this case centered on recruiting inducements and extra benefits provided to two international prospective student-athletes. While one prospect (prospect A) was declared ineligible and never enrolled at Ohio State, the other (prospect B) continued to receive extra benefits and impermissible academic assistance from boosters after enrollment.
Both the former head coach and the former assistant coach challenged the findings of those violations, arguing that they should be set aside because they felt the Committee on Infractions’ findings were contrary to the evidence presented to the committee and that certain allegations were time-barred due to the statute of limitations. The former head coach also argued that the facts found by the committee did not constitute a violation of NCAA rules.
The Committee on Infractions issued its report March 10, 2006, stating that the former head coach and former assistant coach provided $6,000 in cash to assist prospect A’s family in Yugoslavia. The money was provided by the former head coach to the former assistant coach for delivery to the family and both were found in violation of recruiting inducements rules.
The former head coach challenged that violation on two independent grounds. He first claimed that his conduct did not constitute a violation of the impermissible recruiting rules because the prospective student-athlete was ultimately deemed ineligible. The Infractions Appeals Committee rejected that argument as the student-athlete’s ultimate eligibility was unknown at the time of the loan.
The former men’s basketball coach also challenged the violation on the basis of the four-year statute of limitations for NCAA violations. The coach argued that the provision of $6,000 in cash to assist prospect A’s family occurred outside the four-year statute of limitations period and that none of the exceptions to the statute of limitation found in NCAA Bylaw 32.6.3 applied.
NCAA legislation allows for allegations to be considered that occurred outside the statute of limitations when it is demonstrated that allegations affect eligibility of current student-athletes; there is a pattern of willful violations; a blatant disregard of NCAA rules; or concealment of violations occurs. In such cases, the NCAA enforcement staff shall have a one-year period after the date the information concerning the matter becomes available to the NCAA to investigate and submit a notice of allegation concerning the matter to the institution.
The Infractions Appeals Committee ruled that the former men’s basketball coach’s failure to disclose violations constituted concealment. Therefore, the central issue becomes whether the notice of allegation concerning the matter was submitted within the one-year period as outlined in Bylaw 32.6.3(c).
The Committee on Infractions found that the NCAA first learned about the violation May 14, 2004. The enforcement staff sent the notice of allegation to the institution May 13, 2005, and it did not arrive at the university until May 16. The Committee on Infractions took the position that the date the notice of allegation was sent by the enforcement staff was the controlling date for the statute of limitations. However, the Infractions Appeals Committee ruled that to consider allegations that occurred outside the four-year statute of limitations, the controlling date is when the institution receives the information, not when it is sent. Consequently, the Infractions Appeals Committee determined that the provision of $6,000 to prospect A was outside the statute of limitations and could not be considered because the institution did not receive the notice of allegation within one year of the date that the enforcement staff first learned of the violation. Therefore, findings of violation II-A-1, II-A-2 and II-A-3 were reversed.
In the findings of violation by the Committee on Infractions in March 2006, the former head coach and former assistant coach were given an ethical-conduct violation by the committee for their role in making the cash payment to prospect A, knowledge and involvement in impermissible benefits being provided to prospect B and failure to be forthcoming with information. The portion of that unethical-conduct finding related to providing the $6,000 in cash to prospect A was reversed for both coaches by the Infractions Appeals Committee.
The former head men’s basketball coach also appealed the five-year show-cause order penalty. A show-cause penalty means that should the former head men’s basketball coach seek athletically related employment with another NCAA institution, he and the hiring institution must appear before the Committee on Infractions to determine whether his duties should be limited.
Because three of the findings of violation and a portion of another finding of violation for the former head coach were overturned, the Infractions Appeals Committee has remanded the penalty to the Committee on Infractions for reconsideration. The former assistant men’s basketball coach appealed the findings of recruiting inducements and extra benefits as they related to the coach’s knowledge of a booster providing prospect B with lodging, meals, clothing, merchandise, cash and transportation.
The former assistant coach’s first claim for appeal was that the manner in which the NCAA investigation was conducted violated his “constitutional due process rights.” That argument was rejected by the Infractions Appeals Committee as the NCAA membership is allowed to “adopt its own standards and procedures to govern itself.”
The former assistant coach also argued that the NCAA enforcement staff did not adequately support certain findings of violations by the Committee on Infractions. That argument was also rejected as the findings were not contrary to the evidence presented to the Committee on Infractions, and the findings of violation were affirmed.
The members of the Infractions Appeals Committee who heard the case are: Christopher L. Griffin, Foley & Lardner LLP, chair; William P. Hoye, University of Notre Dame; Terry Don Phillips, Clemson University; Noel M. Ragsdale, University of Southern California; and Allan A. Ryan Jr., Harvard University.
Enforcement staff comment
Because much of the appeals decision in the Ohio State University case hinged on when the notice of allegations was submitted and received, the NCAA enforcement staff offered the following clarification to the proceedings in the case:
The deadline central to the Ohio State University infractions appeal scase was moved retroactively, causing the enforcement staff to miss a filing deadline.
On May 18, 2004, Ohio State officials formally reported information to the enforcement staff regarding the former head coach’s provision of a cash loan to a former recruit. After conducting an investigation, the enforcement staff sent the notice of allegations to institutional officials and involved parties in the case on May 13, 2005.
Since most of the allegations were beyond the four-year statute of limitations, the enforcement staff concluded the allegations were still properly made, since two of the exceptions to the statute were satisfied. Only one exception must be satisfied for an allegation to be properly made; however, the staff concluded that two were met:
Pattern of conduct (substantive reversal). One exception [Bylaw 32.6.3-(b)] requires that a pattern of willful conduct exist that began outside the four-year period prescribed by the statute but continued into the time period (there is no time limit imposed on the enforcement staff’s processing of the case associated with this exception, assuming the pattern exists). The enforcement staff alleged that all violations in the case were part of a pattern of willful conduct on the part of the former head and assistant coaches. The Committee on Infractions agreed and made a finding of all alleged violations.
The Infractions Appeals Committee reversed the Committee on Infractions, concluding that the pattern required by the exception did not exist.
Blatant disregard (procedural reversal). Another exception [Bylaw 32.6.3-(c)] requires that a blatant disregard of a fundamental rule occur. For that exception to be satisfied, the enforcement staff must “submit” the notice of allegations one year after learning about the information.
From May 2004 (when the enforcement staff was initially alerted of potential violations) to March 2006, the enforcement staff believed that the trigger date for the one-year exception to the statute of limitations was May 18, 2004, the day Ohio State officially reported.
During a preliminary hearing in December 2005, the enforcement staff learned that the Committee on Infractions might determine that the date was earlier, due to an off-the-record conversation that occurred May 14, 2004 (four days before Ohio State officially reported the information) between an Ohio State official and an enforcement staff member. The two individuals discussed the fact that Ohio State would be officially reporting information involving a possible violation of NCAA rules.
After the December 2005 hearing, the enforcement staff investigated the situation, including hiring an outside investigator, and still believed the trigger date was May 18, 2004. After conducting a full hearing in February 2006, the Committee on Infractions found that the trigger date was actually May 14, 2004, which didn’t have a practical difference in the initial findings (since the exception requiring a pattern of conduct was already satisfied) — it just made the timeline tighter in terms of the second exception requiring a blatant disregard of a fundamental rule. Since the enforcement staff sent the allegations on May 13, the Committee on Infractions found the second exception was also met.
The Infractions Appeals Committee found that “submit” in the bylaw should be interpreted as “receive” rather than “send.” The deadline was shifted retroactively, requiring receipt May 14, 2005. Since the notice of allegations (sent May 13, 2005) was not received until May 16, 2005, the Infractions Appeals Committee vacated the finding.