E (eligibility) + R (retention) = G (graduation). Perhaps not since Einstein has an equation meant so much.

After just a few months of intense discussion and research, Division I is floating a metric to its members designed to provide an accurate measure of academic success upon which an incentives/disincentives structure will be based. That metric, called the Annual Academic Progress Rate (AAPR), went from a concept to a proposal at the Division I Management Council Working Group on Incentives/Disincentives meeting earlier this month and is being distributed to conferences and other groups for feedback before it enters the legislative cycle in July.

The AAPR and the accompanying incentives/disincentives package has been emphasized -- particularly by the Division I Board of Directors and NCAA President Myles Brand -- as what will put teeth in the jaws of academic reform. The package is considered to be the second and perhaps most important stage of the academic reform movement initiated by strengthened initial-eligibility and progress-toward-degree standards that were adopted last fall and become effective for the entering class of 2003.

The framework for the AAPR was developed by gathering academic outcomes from all student-athletes in various sports, including transfers, early exits to the professional ranks and other attrition over a 10-year period from 1991 to 2000. That data, which was much more comprehensive and inclusive than data from the federal graduation-rates methodology, gave the working group what it needed to analyze various "rates" that reflected year-by-year eligibility, retention and graduation for all members of a given sports team on athletics aid. Though researchers and working group members worried that the very nature of the project would produce complicated results, what they discovered surprised them.

After studying almost every possible permutation of the data, the group found that the simplest outcome was in fact the best: E + R = G. In looking at the accuracy of predicting graduation, the simple combination of eligibility and retention was at or near the top of all the measures studied. Working group members looked at weighting either eligibility, retention or both (that is, assigning a greater point value in the calculation to one component over another), or even weighting graduation. But as the complexity of those models increased, the predictability did not significantly exceed that of the simple E + R = G. That combination (one point for each year of eligibility and one point for each year the student-athlete is on the roster) was as good as or better than any other combination (weighted or otherwise) of the variables in question.

Given that the stated goal of the exercise was to find a metric that was "simple, fair and defensible," the working group couldn't have been happier. The AAPR will be simple to calculate since institutions won't be burdened with data collection they don't already do. The only "extra" work for institutions will be determining whether athletes who left would have been eligible had they stayed. And the rate will be easy to understand since each eligible student-athlete on the roster is worth a simple two points per year and there's no weighting involved. For example, a team of 10 student-athletes would earn 20 points for that year if all members were academically eligible and remained at the institution or graduated.

Researchers say the metric is defensible because of the data involved, and because E + R compares so favorably to the other permutations. And administrators say the metric is fair because the AAPR will measure the same thing among institutions -- how athletes are progressing toward their degrees.

"Progress toward degree is the primary measurement," said Vanderbilt University Athletics Director Todd Turner, who chairs the working group. "Everyone is now obligated to fulfill the increased eligibility standards adopted last fall, so the AAPR will measure the same thing for everyone.

"It's understandable and simple. I'm eager to get feedback from the membership to see if they share my view. Sometimes when you've gone through so much of the process to develop it, what appears simple to you may in fact be unintelligible to someone looking at for the first time."

Keep it simple

As an example of how the AAPR might work, take a Division I men's basketball team over a two-year period . Data are compiled in arrears, so for 2003-04, the first year of the calculation, the institution would submit the data in the fall of 2004. Say during the 2003-04 season, the team comprises 13 student-athletes, each of whom is "worth" two points in the AAPR, one point for returning to school and one point for being academically eligible.

Of the 13, one graduates, nine are academically eligible and on the roster for the next season, but three leave the team. Of those, however, the institution determines that all would have been academically eligible had they stayed. Thus, of a possible 26 points, the team earns 23. The only points lost are one each for the three players who left the team. That translates into an Annual Academic Progress Rate of 88.5 percent.

On the 2004-05 roster, say the team brings in five new student-athletes for a total of 14. Two graduate, six are eligible and remain on the roster for the next season, and two transfer who would have been eligible. Those players earn 18 of a possible 20 points. However, two student-athletes who are still on the roster suffer academic problems and are ruled ineligible, thus earning only one point for retention and none for eligibility in that year. Also, the squad loses two players who would have been academic casualties had they stayed, thus earning no points at all. Those four players earn a combined two of eight points. For the 2004-05 season, that team's point total is 20 of a possible 28 for an AAPR of 71.4 percent.

It's easy to see how the AAPR will fluctuate for teams from year to year. That's why the proposal calls for the AAPR to be calculated on a "four-year rolling average" before teams are culled out for the purpose of assessing rewards and penalties. That should keep otherwise academically successful teams that may suffer through an "anomaly" season from being unduly punished.

There are other important checks and balances in the AAPR as well. To help pinpoint only the habitually under-performing teams, the AAPR will employ a series of "filters." The first filter would provide a comparison of Division I teams in all sports. If a particular team fails to meet the cut-off in that filter, it would move on to the next, which would provide a comparison of all Division I teams in just that sport. If the team fails to meet the second standard, it would be subject to a third filter, which would include a comparison with the institution's student body academic performance. If that team's rate still is inferior, then the team would be subject to disincentives.

"At the end of all the filters," Turner said, "you will clearly have schools identified that have significant problems. The filter system helps you get there without making snap judgments based on just one comparative norm. You go from comparing one team to all sports teams, then to other like sports, then against that team's student body. If you're below all three of those, you clearly have some issues you need to address."

It will be up to the Division I Board of Directors to eventually determine what the cut-off points will be in the AAPR and in the various filters. Should a team be required to maintain eligibility for and retain 80 percent of its roster? 70 percent? 50? The Board also will determine the upper range at which incentives would be applied.

Incentives/disincentives structure

Just as the AAPR is set up in an incremental approach, so is the incentives/disincentives structure. If a team is identified as an academic under-performer after all the filters are applied, it will be subjected to disincentives. But that distinction alone doesn't mean instant restriction from NCAA postseason play or an immediate reduction in revenue shares or other NCAA assets. The proposed structure wields a series of behavioral influences rather than a punitive hammer in order to achieve the desired outcome.

First, it will take four years of AAPR data collection before the full array of incentives and disincentives would be implemented. Thus, a team would have to fail repeatedly to be penalized. Under-performance in that four-year period would trigger a warning, and if the team does not improve the next year, scholarship reductions would be likely, with more severe disincentives (including postseason and revenue restrictions) to come if the under-performance continues. There's even an appeal process for institutions that might have legitimate reasons for the under-performance.

That's the process for the so-called "historical" side of the proposed penalty structure. But the incentives/disincentives structure also includes more contemporaneous methods of changing behavior. For example, consideration is being given to restricting the time period in which an institution may re-award a scholarship to a student-athlete who left school and would not have been eligible had he or she stayed. However, consideration also is being given to allowing institutions one departure per team within a four-year cycle that would not be subject to this replacement restriction.

Turner also said the group has discussed allowing institutions to reallocate the scholarship in a departure situation to another student-athlete already on the roster.

"There's general support for reallocating to a student already on the roster who may not be receiving any aid, but not for reallocating to an incoming student," he said.

Some type of recruiting restrictions also might be applied contemporaneously.

As for the incentives side of the equation, there is a sense that teams that exceed academic norms should be provided additional revenue. Other incentives being discussed include additional scholarships, recruiting benefits, additional graduate assistants, academic enhancements and a formal public recognition program.

Challenges to resolve

Turner acknowledged that though the metric has been developed and proposed, not all the kinks have been worked out. That's why discussion during conference meetings in May and June is so important. The working group wants to enter the proposed AAPR and incentives/disincentives structure into the legislative cycle, which means it will need feedback before July 15, the deadline for submitting proposals. To Turner, the more feedback, the better.

"This needs to be debated," he said. "People who raise questions about the AAPR's fairness and its value and its appropriateness further cause us to improve it. But the bottom line has never changed -- our goal is to improve the performance of student-athletes. If how we accomplish that ends up looking a little different than what we've got on paper right now, I'm fine with that, as long as it works."

Some debate already centers on the retention component of the AAPR. Turner said there have been concerns about being punished for not retaining "successful" students.

"There will be some debate about the fact that we've valued retention at all," he said. "What we're trying to do, though, is to discourage programs from having lots of turnover for competitive reasons."

There also is concern regarding situations in which a team's academic success falls well below that of its institution's student body. For example, in schools that normally graduate a high percentage of the student body, say 70 percent, should a graduation rate of 40 percent for the men's basketball team raise a flag even though that 40 percent might compare favorably with most other basketball teams? Additionally, any comparison of graduation rates can only be done using the federally mandated methodology unless institutions were required to calculate graduation rates for the entire student body using the NCAA graduation success rate. Also, there's really no way to apply an AAPR to the student body, which complicates comparisons.

Big Ten Conference Commissioner Jim Delany, a member of the working group, said those concerns pale in comparison to the overall objective.

"We know that today we have programs in trouble," he said. "A lot of people have objected to the way we calculate graduation rates, but the fact is that zero is zero. You can't just create people in the numerator. They can argue about the denominator being too large, but if you never graduate anyone, that's a problem."

As for the potential institutional student body/student-athlete disparity, Delany said that wasn't the working group's primary charge.

"That's not why we're here," he said. "The reason we're here is because some programs aren't graduating anybody at all. If the presidents want to come back and address the student body/student-athlete situation, they can, but the way we ended up was this: The people who you want to reward are the best of the best who exceed their institutional performance, and the people you want to penalize are the weakest of the weak who are at the bottom of their own sports group and who do not achieve even their own institutional rate."

The final concern is about timing. Originally, the working group was operating under the assumption that 2003-04 would be the first year of AAPR data collection. The Division I Board of Directors, however, wondered whether 2004-05 would be better in the spirit of communication and fairness.

Turner said three factors are in play with the timing issue: allowing enough time to assess the impact of the enhanced initial-eligibility and progress-toward-degree standards; providing adequate notice to the membership; and ensuring everything is in order from a legal standpoint.

Now that the metric is better defined, however, and there's a better sense of what the contemporaneous penalties might be, the working group may approach the Board again in August about 2003-04 being the data launch point. In that time frame, contemporaneous penalties could be applied in 2004-05, and penalties tied to the historical application of the AAPR could be administered during the fall of 2007.